Whatever your view of the transition, UK nuclear build times and costs are an outlier against South Korea, and historically against France.
What, specifically, drives the gap — regulation (ONR/GDA), financing, supply chain, or design churn? Comparative evidence especially welcome.
I don’t know much about the formal/actual execution strategies for engineering and construction of UK nuclear plants. But I do notice what appears to be extended (excessive?) timescales and cost. Based on my past experience on major UK eng/const projects where there were deliberate attempts and large investments to improve construction productivity. For all I know they have thought of all this.
delay start of any construction until engineering at least 30% complete. Consider waiting longer than 30% for a nuclear project. Construction Manger’s decision as to when to start.
ruthless about allowing engineering design and field change (know this very difficult, but do it anyway)
align owner/contractor interests with a progressive milestone incentive plan payable to contractor and encourage sharing successful payments with staff that can and will work to targets–not just exectives. With targets mutually argued/agreed with Owner’s project team and set as the project progresses. Avoid job-end bonus payments. Bonuses available in the categories of Cost, Schedule, Quality, and Safety.
avoid “huge” projects, unless the project delivers existing technology with minimum change, e.g. replicating and existing successful plant.
scrutinise and ensure cost and schedule estimates are “world class” and not naive and too optimistic. Separate the incentive milestones based on schedule to be different than set with contractor with another “secret” schedule agreed with Owner (for commissioning and startup execution). Merge the two schedules into one public schedule say at ~80% complete.
Measure construction productivity in great detail and publish each week a summary comparing with world-class, productivity performance in site newspaper so that all site employees can be aware of how they compare. Stoke competition with rest of world.
strong collaboration with “sister” projects. Eliminate real and imaginary so-called “Chinese Walls” (as I hear has developed between Sizewell B and C)
… my list of recollections longer, but enough for now. (I don’t know what to suggest about fixing the apparent regulation problem)
Would be interesting to read the Sizewell C project execution plan in which I would look for a summary of their analysis of specific plans to improve (or even de-risk) cost/schedule/quality/safety.
Rob, thanks, and sorry again for the slow start. This is the practitioner’s view the thread needed. On your first point: does anyone know how far Sizewell C’s design had got when construction began? And has anyone here seen its project execution plan, as Rob asks?
A good place to start is with how Brian George was able to meet all the targets for time and budget in building Sizewell B.
He’s the closest thing the UK had to a Marcel Boiteux, who was the key driver of the French nuclear industry. Boiteux’s remit was wider than just managing a single project: he managed the whole industry, and got the politicians onside and the public to accept the programme (though not without some personal risk - there was an attempt on his life by extremists at one point).
I’ll see if I can find the obituary that explained his role in the French programme and how he tackled obstacles. Of course, in those days the French sometimes subscribed to Dirigisme.
Thanks… took a look at the link. a lot to learn from and I trust Sizewell C continues same vein. But hearing (can’t attribute as I heard under Chatham House Rules) that “chinese walls” between B and C brings concern.
I liked in the piece:
In that vein, he commissioned a 1 inch: 1 foot model of all the rooms in the station with wiring and pipework construction in it. He recalls it cost £7 million to produce that model (£21 million today), but it was “worth every penny, because all the contractors could look at it and agree on the access and timing they needed for each space.”
and
He recalls his early lesson from Australia: “you could not afford to get into a long argument and lose it.”
and
He offered them a £10 million bonus, £100,000 for each of 100 key dates, but £0 if they were 8 weeks late, “no argument, no discussion.”
Finally …
But what about the future of the sector? George himself does worry about the younger generation of engineers. He observes that modern advances have vastly expanded our technical capability, it has come at the expense of the personal relationships. He remembers that on Sizewell B, “every week you were on site, you could talk to everybody. You got to find engineers who can do all of those things. Now kids have their faces in their phones. They don’t have that capability anymore.”
Of course, also the Fingleton Review captured many of the changes needed.
Replacing the Obstruction of Nuclear Renaissance is becoming urgent.
Sizewell C and B are very different. One of the best lessons is one that Boiteux applied in France: select low cost, proven technology rather than political choices (he opted for Westinghouse PWRs over French designs), and then build it repeatedly to benefit from learning curves on top.
Will be comforting to hear someday that the Fingleton Review changes are at least tried.